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political institutions.
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The 2010 Round of Congressional Redistricting in new england
I n t r o d u c t I o n
In the spring of 2012, we were privileged to organize and present a panel on “Redistricting in  
New England” at the Annual Meeting of the New England Political Science Association (NEPSA) in 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire. This booklet consists of papers that are based on the presentations  
made by the panelists and, in one case (Rhode Island), a paper written by two of our students in a  
2011 Congressional Redistricting course at Clark University.
The United States Constitution requires that  
 the number of representatives in Congress be 
reapportioned among the states based on a decennial 
census, and the U.S. Supreme Court ruled half a  
century ago that congressional districts within each  
state must be, as nearly as practicable, equal in 
population. However, the actual drawing of district  
lines for our national lower house and the methods 
employed for doing so are largely left to the individual 
states. Redistricting thus presents a fertile field for  
the comparative examination of state politics and 
political institutions.
New England has become, by many measures, the  
most Democratic-leaning region in the United States.  
It might seem, at first, that this would make redistricting 
in this region rather uninteresting. However, in four 
of its five states that redrew congressional district 
lines after the 2010 census (Vermont, because of its 
small population, has had but one district since 1933), 
partisan considerations played a significant part in the 
recent round of redistricting. As the papers collected 
here vividly demonstrate, the outcomes of each state’s 
redistricting processes reflect the interplay of a variety 
of factors:
•  the very different responses by the majority party in 
the state legislature to a perceived electoral threat to 
a co-partisan member of Congress (New Hampshire 
and Rhode Island);
•  the possibility of achieving partisan gain — even 
in the “zero sum” situation of the two-district 
states — through the delicate calculus of improving 
a party’s chances enough to win one district, while 
diminishing their chances just enough so as not to 
lose the other (Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode 
Island);
•  the possibility that, because of the unusual state 
laws regarding the allocation of electoral votes, 
redistricting could conceivably affect the outcome  
of a future presidential election (Maine);
•  the role of independent, nonpartisan redistricting 
entities in redrawing a state’s district lines 
(Connecticut and Maine); 
•  the appeal, to legislators, judges, and citizens, of 
maintaining the status quo or something close to it 
when drawing new district boundaries (Connecticut, 
Maine, and New Hampshire).
1
2The only state where complete one-party control of 
the congressional delegation appeared secure from the 
outset —  Massachusetts — was also the only state in 
the region that was losing a seat, due to the Bay State’s 
slow growth relative to the rest of the nation over 
the past decade. The “musical chairs” nature of that 
process was unique in the region for this decade. 
One theme that emerges from this examination of 
the 2010 round of redistricting in the five states is the 
relative invisibility of the process to voters. There are 
many possible explanations for this. It may be because 
most voters tended to wind up in a similar district to 
their previous one, because most voters calculated 
that line-drawing decisions would have little impact 
on things they cared about, or simply because voters 
were unaware of the process (an unawareness no 
doubt abetted by the relative lack of media coverage 
of redistricting). Whatever the reason, the state-by-
state accounts here show that there is little citizen 
engagement in the redistricting process. Also, because 
of the relative homogeneity of the population in the 
region and its relatively placid recent history regarding 
voter qualifications and procedures, considerations of 
race and the Voting Rights Act played only a small role 
in the region’s drawing of new district lines. 
We are publishing these articles in part because we 
believe that today, far more than in previous years, 
citizens have the tools to engage constructively in 
redistricting. In our experience at Clark teaching 
students about the process (discussed in our article 
“Teaching Redistricting to Undergraduates: Letting 
the People Draw the Lines for the People’s House,” PS: 
Political Science & Politics 46 (2): 387-394), we were 
struck by our students’ interest in the process and their 
efforts to consider the broader public interest in their 
own line-drawing efforts. We offer these essays with 
the hope that we can add to the historical record that 
will guide policymakers and citizens the next time New 
England’s congressional district lines are drawn.
We are grateful for the knowledge, insight, and 
expository skills of all of our colleagues who authored 
the articles in this compendium: John Baughman, 
Diana Evans, Amelia Najjar, Nicholas Rossi, and Dante 
Scala. We also thank Maureen Moakley who made 
the presentation on Rhode Island at the Portsmouth 
meeting and advised on the Rhode Island article herein. 
We owe a special debt of thanks to Nicholas Giner, 
our co-author on the Massachusetts article, who also 
applied his skills as a geographer to produce the maps 
for each of the state articles. Finally, we gratefully 
acknowledge the generous support of Clark University’s 
Mosakowski Institute for Public Enterprise, which made 
both the NEPSA panel and this booklet possible.
JIM GOMES   ROBERT BOATRIGHT
Director   Associate Professor
Mosakowski Institute for   Political Science
  Public Enterprise  Clark University
Clark University
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RedisTRiCTing in ConneCTiCuT,  2011-2012   
Diana Evans*
Redistricting in Connecticut is not the 
usual raw partisan affair, although 
partisanship plays a significant role. 
The Connecticut Constitution, Article 
III, Section 6, requires the appointment 
of a bipartisan “reapportionment 
committee” by legislative leaders of 
both parties; the committee consists 
of an equal number of Republicans and 
Democrats. The timeline is as follows:
By Feb. 15, “the general assembly shall 
appoint a reapportionment committee 
consisting of four members of the 
senate, two who shall be designated 
by the president pro tempore of 
the senate and two who shall be 
designated by the minority leader of 
the senate, and four members of the 
house of representatives, two who 
shall be designated by the speaker 
of the house of representatives 
and two who shall be designated 
by the minority leader of the house 
of representatives” (Connecticut 
Constitution, Article III, Section 6). 
Those leaders virtually always select 
themselves and a top deputy or other 
loyalist.
If that committee agrees on a plan 
before Sept. 15, it is presented to the 
General Assembly, which must adopt 
the plan by a 2/3 majority for it to take 
effect. If the redistricting committee 
fails to adopt a plan by Sept. 15, the 
governor is required to appoint a 
“reapportionment commission” which, 
in practice, consists of the existing 
eight-member committee and a ninth 
member chosen within thirty days by 
the original eight members. Although 
the ninth member obviously was 
intended to serve as a tie-breaker, 
historically he played that role only in 
the 1981 redistricting; in other years, 
that member has been neutral, as he 
was, by explicit agreement among 
commission members, in 2011. If the 
commission adopts a redistricting plan 
by a simple majority by November 30, 
the plan becomes law.
However, if the commission fails to 
meet the November 30 deadline 
or if an adopted plan is appealed, 
the Connecticut Supreme Court 
takes over. The court may order the 
redistricting commission to alter its 
plan or it may draw up its own plan. 
The Supreme Court must issue or 
approve a final plan by February 15. In 
2011, the commission failed to adopt 
a plan for Congress and the Supreme 
Court intervened.
Redistricting in Connecticut is 
designed to be controlled by the 
General Assembly’s party leadership; 
therefore, partisanship is inevitably 
and intentionally at the heart of the 
process. However, each party is given 
equal power; even the appointment of 
the ninth member must be minimally 
bipartisan. As long as the redistricting 
commission controls the process, 
any plan to which it agrees must 
be bipartisan. If the commission is 
committed to devising a plan before 
the Supreme Court has a chance to 
take over, each party can be expected 
to minimize its losses. That is because 
neither party is in a position to make 
major gains at the other party’s 
expense, as would be the case with 
purely partisan gerrymandering. 
Thus, if the two parties enjoy an even 
division of seats, any plan to which the 
commission agrees is likely to protect 
the status quo, meaning incumbents.
However, several factors can 
introduce a potentially destabilizing 
set of threats and opportunities: 
the loss or gain of a seat in the 
decennial reapportionment, the 
emergence of one or more open 
seats, or the existence of substantial 
seat advantage to one party. 
Such circumstances increase the 
incentive for one party or the other 
to withhold agreement and gamble 
on the Supreme Court. That is what 
happened in 2011-12.
 
1  The Republican, Nancy Johnson, won the 2002 
election by a relatively narrow 54 percent. 
*Professor of Political Science, Trinity College
r e d I s t r I c t I n g  I n  2 0 0 1 :  
c o n n e c t I c u t  L o s e s  a 
d I s t r I c t
In the 1990s, Connecticut’s population 
grew less than that of many other 
states; as a consequence, the state lost 
one of its six congressional districts 
in the 2001 reapportionment. Not 
surprisingly, the ensuing redistricting 
process was unusually contentious but 
nevertheless produced a bipartisan 
compromise: it essentially combined 
the 5th District, represented by 
Democrat Jim Maloney, and the 6th 
District, held by Republican Nancy 
Johnson. The commission did so 
by shifting the boundaries of the 
surrounding districts in such a way that 
their partisan balance was not upset, 
and by drawing the new 5th district 
to make it as competitive as possible, 
giving both incumbents a reasonable 
chance of winning it.1 
The resulting 5th district encompassed 
much of northwestern portion of the 
state. Approximately 21 percent of the 
population is in Republican-leaning 
Litchfield County, which had been part 
of Johnson’s old district. Some of the 
more Democratic-leaning cities of the 
of old 5th district, cities that had been 
in Maloney’s base, were also included 
in the new 5th district. However, in the 
interest of creating a competitive 5th 
district and protecting incumbents in 
the other four districts, one of the key 
Democratic towns — Bristol — was 
carved out and placed in the heavily 
Democratic 1st district, as were some 
of the smaller Republican-leaning 
towns of the northeastern part of the 
old 6th district. The resulting 2001 
map (Figure 1) was characterized 
by a “claw” shape (formed by the 
1st district) on its eastern boundary, 
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laying the groundwork for a Republican 
challenge to any Democratic map that 
preserved that shape. 
In the first two elections following the 
2001 redistricting, Republicans enjoyed 
an advantage, holding three of the 
five House seats (including the new 
5th District), despite the fact that the 
state had been trending Democratic 
for a number of years. However, in the 
Democratic wave elections of 2006 
and 2008, all three Republicans lost 
their seats, upsetting the partisan 
balance and giving Republican 
redistricters in 2011 less to lose by 
proposing a more radical redistricting 
plan, one that was virtually certain to 
throw the decision to the Supreme 
Court.
r e d I s t r I c t I n g  I n  2 0 1 1
The leaders of each party in each 
chamber appointed themselves and a 
member of their respective leadership 
teams to the redistricting committee. 
The co-chairs were Senate President 
Pro Tempore Donald Williams (D) 
and House Minority Leader Lawrence 
Cafero (R). The other two legislative 
leaders on the committee were House 
Speaker Christopher Donovan (D) 
and Senate Minority Leader John 
McKinney (R). However, Speaker 
Donovan, as a candidate for the 
open 5th District House seat, was 
pressured by Republicans to resign 
(although that pressure did not come 
from the Republican members of the 
commission itself), which he did on 
Nov. 30 after the state legislative 
district plan was completed but 
before significant work began on the 
congressional map. He appointed 
Majority Leader Brendan Sharkey to 
take his place. 
FIgure 1: connectIcut congressIonaL 
dIstrIcts, 2002-2010
The committee held six public hearings 
in July 2011, in Hartford (two hearings), 
New Haven, Norwich, Norwalk and 
Waterbury. Testimony was given by 
a number of state House members 
as well as citizens’ groups such as 
Common Cause and the Latino and 
Puerto Rican Affairs Commission, along 
with a number of interested individuals. 
Much of the testimony pertained to 
state legislative districts, but there 
was some comment on congressional 
districts as well.
The Reapportionment Committee 
(as it was officially known) took as 
its first task the redrawing of the 
state’s 187 House and Senate districts. 
The Committee acknowledged on 
September 9 that, as in 1991 and 
2001, it would fail to meet its Sept. 
15 deadline to redraw lines for the 
state districts, necessitating the 
appointment of a ninth member. 
(Pazniokas, Sept. 9, 2011).  After the 
Sept. 15 deadline, the Committee 
officially became the Reapportionment 
Commission and appointed former 
Democratic State Auditor Kevin 
Johnston as its ninth member. 
However, the Commission, following 
past precedent, was committed not 
to cede the process to Johnston’s 
potentially tie-breaking vote; rather, 
they decided either to reach a 
bipartisan compromise or turn the 
process over to the Supreme Court 
for the first time ever (Pazniokas, 
November 30, 2011). Indeed, according 
to the Connecticut Mirror, Johnston was 
not part of the daily negotiations at all 
(Pazniokas, Nov. 22, 2011).
The Commission unanimously 
approved state legislative districts in 
late November, but had made little 
progress on congressional districts, 
ensuring that formal control of the 
redistricting process would pass to the 
Supreme Court. However, the Court, 
FIgure 2: House/senate congressIonaL 
dIstrIct excHange, 11/10/2011
in an effort to keep redistricting in the 
hands of legislative leaders, extended 
the Commission’s deadline until 
December 21. 
In Connecticut, congressional districts 
have to be (as in every other state) 
as nearly equal in population as 
practicable. Given shifts in the state’s 
population of 3,574,097 (United States 
Census 2010), the largest change 
was to be made to the 2nd District, 
comprising the entire eastern portion of 
the state; 15,000 people in that district 
would have to be moved to adjacent 
districts to produce an average district 
size across the state of approximately 
714,819 people. Although it is not 
legally required, redistricters generally 
attempt not to split any of the state’s 
169 towns into more than one district. 
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FIgure 4: democratIc (LeFt) and repubLIcan pLans compared
The large number of towns relative to 
population makes this relatively easy to 
achieve, with only a few exceptions as 
required to achieve population equality 
or political goals.
If the objective were to maintain the 
status quo, the relatively small changes 
required by population shifts between 
2000 and 2001 would mean that the 
pre-existing partisan balance could 
rather easily be maintained. Thus, 
the Commission’s four Democrats 
proposed a map that largely 
maintained existing boundaries, while 
shifting lines slightly to add population 
to all but the 2nd District (Figure 2).
Yet despite the fact that the largest 
changes were required in the 
eastern part of the state, Republican 
redistricters focused on the western 
districts, where they saw the greatest 
potential for gains (Figure 3). They 
proposed a map that would have made 
the newly Democratic 4th District 
solidly Republican, and shifted the 5th 
to a more Republican leaning as well. 
Indeed, until Democrat Jim Himes’ 
defeat of Chris Shays in 2008, the 
4th district had consistently elected 
moderate Republicans to the House. 
The Republicans’ major proposal for 
that district would have moved the 
Democratic city of Bridgeport out 
of the 4th District into the already 
heavily Democratic 3rd District, home 
to New Haven, another overwhelming 
Democratic city. That change would 
have left the 4th district even more 
heavily dominated by affluent Fairfield 
County, with its more Republican 
inclinations. This proposal prompted 
accusations from minority group 
representatives, including the NAACP, 
that Republicans were attempting 
to “bleach” the 4th District without 
significantly increasing the probability 
of electing a minority representative in 
the 3rd District. 
By the court-imposed December 
21 deadline, Republicans on the 
redistricting commission had backed 
off that proposal but continued to 
pursue the second part of their plan, 
which involved drawing the 5th 
District’s lines in a manner more 
favorable to Republican candidates 
(Altimari, Dec. 22, 2011). As the 
5th District was to be an open seat 
in 2012, it offered the best chance 
for a Republican gain in 2012. The 
Republican plan again moved a heavily 
Democratic city — New Britain —  
from the 5th District to the already 
Democratic 1st District. It also moved 
Torrington, which is competitive, and 
some smaller Republican towns from 
the 1st into the 5th; both changes 
would make the 5th more Republican. 
To accomplish this goal, Republican 
map-makers increased the 
compactness of the district. Their 
map eliminated the 1st District’s 
claw around heavily Democratic New 
Britain, drawing that city into the 1st 
District and moving back into the 
5th District six Republican-leaning 
towns currently in the northwestern 
part of the 1st District: Colebrook, 
Hartland, Barkhamsted, New Hartford 
and Granby. Figure 4 compares 
the Democrats’ and Republicans’ 
proposals.
However, Democrats, especially 
African-American Democrats, 
strenuously opposed those changes as 
well: although the 1st District’s minority 
population would have grown from 35 
percent to 40 percent, the minority 
population in the 5th District would 
have declined from 27 percent to 20 
percent. Given that the 1st District was 
already solidly Democratic and the 5th 
District was much more competitive, 
that change might have resulted in a 
net decline in minority group influence 
by making it no more likely that the 1st 
District would elect a Democrat and 
less likely that the 5th District would 
do so. “Black and Latino politicians, all 
Democrats, said the Republicans’ claim 
that their plan would have enhanced 
chances for a minority candidate to 
eventually be elected in the 1st was 
a pretext. If the GOP was interested 
in helping minorities, they might 
FIgure 3: map proposed by connectIcut 
repubLIcans
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have consulted with the legislature’s 
Black and Puerto Rican Caucus, said 
Rep. Gary Holder-Winfield, D-New 
Haven. ‘That didn’t happen,’ he said” 
(Pazniokas, Dec. 21, 2011).
Given the disparity between the two 
parties’ proposals and the lack of 
incentive of either to compromise, the 
commission failed to reach agreement 
by its court-imposed deadline of Dec. 
21. House Minority Leader Lawrence 
Cafero said that the two parties had 
agreed on all but 13 towns, “with most 
of the disagreement centering around 
the ragged border of the 1st and 5th 
districts. ‘I think it boils down to New 
Britain,’ Cafero said” (Pazniokas, Dec. 
21, 2011).
On December 28, the Hartford 
Courant reported that the Supreme 
Court would appoint a special master 
(from candidates nominated by 
commission members) to redraw the 
district lines. On December 30, the 
Court chose political scientist and 
lawyer Nathan Persily of the Columbia 
University Law School. Within days, 
the Court essentially tied the special 
master’s hands, issuing the following 
instructions:
2.  In developing the plan, the Special 
Master shall modify the existing 
congressional districts only to 
the extent reasonably required to 
comply with the following applicable 
legal requirements:
    a.  Districts shall be as equal in 
population as is practicable.
    b.  Districts shall be made of 
contiguous territory.
    c.  The plan shall comply with 42 
U.S.c. § 1973(b) and with other 
applicable provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act and federal law.
3.  In no event shall the plan of the 
Special Master be substantially 
less compact than the existing 
congressional districts and in no 
event shall the plan of the Special 
Master substantially violate 
town lines more than the existing 
congressional districts. (Supreme 
Court, Jan. 23, 2012)
The key to the eventual outcome is in 
the instructions on compactness: in (3) 
above, the Court ordered that districts 
not be made less compact than they 
currently were, but did not require that 
they be made more compact, a key 
feature of the Republican proposal. 
Given that the special master was 
also ordered to approve only minimal 
changes to the existing map, it was 
unlikely that he, or, more importantly, 
the Court, would approve the 
Republican proposal. 
Indeed, the Democratic proposal had 
the clear advantage. As the Connecticut 
Mirror reported, “The Democratic plan 
makes no changes in 164 of the 169 
towns. It equalizes the populations 
of the districts by shifting the lines in 
four communities currently divided 
between two districts: Glastonbury, 
Middletown, Shelton and Waterbury. 
Durham, now split between the 2nd 
and 3rd districts, would be united in the 
3rd. Torrington, which is split between 
the 1st and 5th, would be unchanged” 
(Pazniokas, January 6, 2012).
In a public hearing before the special 
master, held on Jan. 9, Republican 
commission members argued correctly 
that the current 5th district acquired 
its “bizarre” shape as a result of the 
merging of districts in 2001. Given that 
the 5th District was gerrymandered 
to make it competitive between two 
incumbents, Republicans essentially 
argued that its lines should not be 
considered sacrosanct and that 
greater compactness should and easily 
could be achieved in redistricting. 
As Republicans argued in an earlier 
brief to the Supreme Court, between 
the reapportionment of 1964, when 
Connecticut was awarded its sixth 
congressional district, and 1991, the 
maps “reflected compact districts and 
aligned communities of interest.” Thus, 
Republicans argued that the Court 
should return to that standard and treat 
the 2001 map as an anomaly. (Supreme 
Court, Reply of the Republican 
Members of the Reapportionment 
Commission, 2011). 
By contrast, Democrats argued that 
their own map, which largely preserved 
the status quo, had stood the test of 
time and had not been subject to legal 
challenges. Moreover, they noted that 
the district had proved competitive, as 
it had been won twice by a Republican 
and three times by a Democrat. 
On January 13, Special Master Persily 
issued his draft report; as instructed, 
he made minimal changes to the 
existing map (Figure 5). He noted 
that while his plan achieved slightly 
greater compactness, “Both the Special 
Master’s Plan and the Democrats’ Plan 
reunite Durham and split Glastonbury, 
Middletown, Shelton, Torrington, and 
FIGURE 5: SPECIAL MASTER’S PLAN; 
CONNECTICUT CONGRESSIONAL  
DISTRICTS 2012
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Waterbury” (Persily 2012, p. 25). 
Thus, the towns contested by the 
Republicans stayed where they were 
placed in 2001.
On February 10, only five days ahead 
of the Constitutional deadline, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court adopted 
the special master’s recommended 
map, handing victory to the Democratic 
members of the Reapportionment 
Commission and setting the stage for 
a more competitive race for the open 
5th District seat than the Republicans 
would have preferred. Republicans’ 
fears were realized in 2012 as 
Democrat Elizabeth Esty won the seat 
by a 52 to 48 percent margin. The 
state’s other four representatives all 
won comfortably.
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Nationally, the 2010 election gave 
Republicans not only a large majority 
in the U.S. House of Representatives 
by recent standards — and their 
largest caucus since the Truman 
Administration — but enough victories 
in state legislatures to suggest they 
could use the redistricting process 
to maintain their majority past 2012. 
After that election, they had legislative 
majorities in 25 states, the most since 
1928. This gave Republicans arguably 
their greatest advantage in redistricting 
in a century, and certainly since the 
advent of the modern redistricting 
process in 1962.1
The results in Maine seemed to be 
of a piece. For the first time in almost 
half a century, Republicans won the 
governorship and majorities in both 
chambers of the state legislature. 
Not only had the party won control, 
but the conservative Tea Party wing 
was ascendant at the expense of the 
more moderate state Republican 
establishment. To the surprise of 
many both inside the party and out, 
conservatives were able to replace the 
establishment’s party platform with a 
much more conservative, Tea Party-
inspired alternative (Wickenheiser 
2010). With these victories came 
great expectations, including the hope 
that redrawing the state’s legislative 
and congressional districts might help 
Republicans. As one Republican voter 
said at a public hearing on the party’s 
map, elections have consequences.
Nevertheless, the experience in 
Maine appears at odds with these 
expectations. After Republicans 
proposed a bold redrawing of the 
state’s two congressional districts, the 
state legislature approved a plan that 
was nearly identical to the previous 
map and provided the GOP negligible 
advantage. Institutional and political 
constraints prevented Republicans 
from using their majority to reshape 
Maine electoral politics, although they 
could claim a small victory in shifting 
the redistricting calendar to conform to 
the rest of the country.
H I s t o r y  a n d  p r o c e s s
Maine is one of three states that 
use an advisory panel to hold public 
hearings and to draft redistricting 
recommendations for the state 
legislature, here called the Legislative 
Apportionment Commission. The 
commission has 15 members, seven 
appointed by the Democrats and 
seven by the Republicans, with the 
fifteenth member selected by the 
other commissioners and serving as 
chair.2 In practice, because the major 
parties typically submit two competing 
plans for consideration, this means 
the recommended plan is determined 
by that fifteenth commissioner. After 
a recommendation has been made, 
the legislature has 120 days to act. 
Congressional redistricting in Maine 
occurs through an act of the legislature, 
signed by the governor, and requires 
a two-thirds vote of each chamber. 
Should they fail to act by the deadline, 
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court 
takes responsibility for the redistricting.
In other ways Maine has been even 
more unusual in its electoral practices. 
Throughout much of the 19th century, 
election dates varied widely from state 
to state, sometimes by more than a 
year. An 1872 federal law standardized 
federal elections on the first Tuesday 
after the first Monday in November of 
even numbered years. However, that 
law made an exception for those states 
which had an election date specified in 
their state constitutions. So it was for 
Maine. Not until 1958, several decades 
after the last state, did it revert to the 
national standard.
Can’T geT TheRe fRom heRe:  maine’s Circuitous 2011 Redistricting  
John Baughman*
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1  Because there was no reapportionment following the 
1920 census, the last time the Republican Party had 
such influence over redistricting was after the 1910 
census.
2  To be more specific, three commissioners are selected 
by the state House majority leader and three by 
the minority leader, two each from the state Senate 
majority and minority leaders, one by the chair of the 
Maine Democratic Party, and one by the chair of the 
Maine Republican Party.  Each party’s contingent of 
six appointees chooses a seventh from the public, and 
these two partisan commissioners select the fifteenth 
member.
*Associate Professor of Political Science, Bates College
Two more recent deviations from 
national practice are relevant here. 
First, since the 1972 election Maine 
has allocated its Electoral College 
votes by congressional district, one 
elector per district plus two for the 
candidate winning the statewide 
vote. Second, by state law starting 
in 1983, congressional redistricting 
has been conducted in the third year 
after a decennial census, rather than 
in the second year as in every other 
state. Both of these variants, the latter 
unique in the country and the former 
nearly so, affected party strategy in the 
redistricting that occurred following 
the 2010 census.
r e p u b L I c a n  g a m b I t
The strategy of Maine Republicans had 
two linked elements, to draw a map 
more favorable to their candidates and 
to change the date the map would take 
effect in order to increase its impact. 
To redraw the map, the most direct 
route would be to have it approved 
by the commission, and they would 
need to convince its nonpartisan chair. 
As a result, in addition to a strategic 
motivation the plan put forward had 
also a public rationale.
Ever since Maine went from three 
congressional districts to two following 
the 1960 census, the line dividing 
the first district from the second has 
followed a very similar path:  
A southern, largely coastal district 
ranged from Kittery at the New 
Hampshire border northeast to 
Camden and inland to Augusta, with 
the second district comprising the 
much sparser and more expansive 
remainder of the state. The two 
districts corresponded roughly to 
what some call the “two Maines” 
with one poorer, more rural and more 
conservative than the other (Fried 
2012). Adjustments to account for 
population migrations following Baker 
v. Carr involved shifting towns from the 
first district to the second — usually 
in Kennebec, Waldo and Knox 
counties — creating districts that 
became progressively even more 
divergent in their land mass and 
urbanicity. Figure 1 shows Maine’s two 
congressional districts as they stood 
before redistricting.
Instead, Republicans proposed using 
a north-south boundary to divide the 
first and second districts, as shown in 
Figure 2. It was a dramatic shift from 
practices of the previous half century, 
and also yielded a sharp contrast with 
the Democratic plan (shown in Figure 
3), which would retain something far 
closer to the status quo. In a state of 
1.3 million people, about 300,000 
would have changed districts under the 
Republican plan whereas only a few 
thousand would have done so in the 
incremental Democratic alternative. 
The Maine GOP reasoned that their 
plan would reduce the socioeconomic 
divisions between the two districts, 
but the Republican plan, would also 
serve a strategic purpose. The shifts 
would have added far more Republican 
voters to the first district, making the 
seat less safely Democratic, and at 
the same time the current Democratic 
incumbents, Chellie Pingree and 
Mike Michaud, would be forced to 
run against each other in the second 
district (Metzler 2011). If the cards 
fell right, the strategy could net 
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Republicans two seats in the House. As 
a further constraint on the Democrats, 
they insisted that any redistricting plan 
ought to leave a population difference 
of only a single resident, as theirs did.
The second prong in their strategy 
involved moving the effective date for 
Maine’s congressional redistricting 
to 2012 in order to conform to the 
rest of the country. Under state law, 
redistricting would not occur until 2013 
and take effect with the 2014 midterm 
election. Two Republicans living in the 
1st district, which had gained several 
thousand residents since the previous 
census compared with the 2nd, filed 
suit in federal district court, arguing 
that this diluted the value of their vote 
in the 2012 election in violation of the 
one-person, one-vote principle outlined 
in Baker v. Carr (Hench 2011). Named 
as defendants were Gov. Paul LePage, 
President of the Maine Senate Kevin 
Raye, Speaker of the Maine House 
Robert Nutting, and Maine Secretary 
of State Charles Summers. All these 
defendants, however, were Republicans 
and supportive of the lawsuit, and Raye 
was running in the Republican primary 
to be the party’s nominee for the 2nd 
district race.
Although Republicans did not say 
so publicly, presidential politics 
helped to motivate their strategy. 
The reason has to do with another 
of Maine’s peculiarities. As noted 
above, since the 1972 election Maine 
has allocated its Electoral College 
votes by congressional district. It has 
not yet resulted in a split vote, but it 
has affected election strategy in the 
state on multiple occasions.3  Ross 
Perot came closest in 1992, finishing 
less than five percentage points away 
3  Nebraska, which has also allocated its electors by 
congressional district since 1992, did split its votes in 
2008, with Barack Obama winning the 2nd district in 
Omaha while John McCain won the other Nebraska 
districts and the state popular vote.
from winning an elector. With the 
state becoming more Democratic over 
the last two decades of presidential 
elections, Republicans have seen the 
2nd district as their best, and arguably 
only, shot at winning an electoral vote 
in the state, with the George W. Bush 
and John McCain campaigns devoting 
resources there. Barack Obama 
received 55 percent of the district’s 
vote in 2008 and would receive 53 
percent in the new district in 2012.
Even the 2nd district, consistently the 
more conservative of the two, has begun 
to slip out of reach for Republicans  — in 
2010, an excellent year for Republicans, 
Mike Michaud (D) won reelection 
by 13 percentage points (Sambides 
2010) — raising the stakes for this 
redistricting effort. Moving Republican 
voters from the 1st district to the 2nd 
would cede three of four electoral votes 
to Democrats while making the race for 
that fourth elector more competitive. 
Not since Rutherford Hayes vs. Samuel 
Tilden in 1876 has a presidential race 
come down to a single electoral vote, 
but there were plausible scenarios 
that would have produced a 269-269 
outcome in 2012 — or 270-268 in favor 
of Republicans were they to peel away 
an elector in Maine (Goodman 2011).4 
The strategy was in keeping with 
national GOP conversations about 
how to tilt the electoral map in their 
favor in 2012 and beyond. Pennsylvania 
Republicans, for example, came 
close to enacting a law to allocate its 
electoral votes by congressional district 
in the manner of Maine and Nebraska. 
The state has voted for the Democratic 
nominee since 1992 and in recent 
years has been shedding its reputation 
as a swing state to become solidly 
Democratic in presidential elections. 
State GOP leaders believed that such 
a system, together with strategic 
redistricting, would benefit the party’s 
presidential chances (Silver 2011; 
Seelye 2011).
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4  For a recent analysis of plausible scenarios which 
could result in an Electoral College tie, see Silver 
(2012).
d e m o c r at I c  r e s p o n s e
The Democrats chose to defend the 
status quo, or at least something very 
close to it. The plan they put forward 
proposed only incremental changes 
of the sort used since 1962, shifting 
a single town from the 1st district to 
the 2nd in order to create more equal 
populations but preserving the shape 
of the previous map (Metzler 2011). 
This would have kept the 1st district 
solidly Democratic, the 2nd district 
leaning Democratic, and both of the 
party’s incumbents in safe and familiar 
constituencies. Indeed, it was precisely 
the incrementalism that they used in 
trying to persuade the nonpartisan 
commission chair, Michael Friedman, 
to adopt their plan over the Republican 
one. Friedman asked the parties to 
submit new plans in order to find 
compromise, so Democrats offered a 
variation on their previous plan, this 
time shifting six additional towns but 
reducing the population difference 
to one resident, as Republicans had 
insisted (Russell 2011a).
If the presidential election helped to 
motivate the Republican strategy, it 
also helped to drive the Democratic 
response. Protection of their two 
incumbents also played a part. Because 
the governor would not defend the 
state against the lawsuit to move 
up the redistricting date, the Maine 
Democratic Party filed an intervening 
brief in order to avoid a default 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (Kim 
2011). Democrats argued that the 
population difference was still small 
and that the court ought to defer to 
the orderly process set out in state 
law and used for the three previous 
redistrictings. Case law and data were 
not on their side, but they hoped for 
a cautious court that would defer 
judgment to the state.
o u t c o m e
The first shoe to drop was the federal 
district court ruling on the redistricting 
date. On June 9, the three-judge panel 
announced that Maine had to resolve 
the population inequity between the 
districts prior to the 2012 election 
(Canfield 2011). In order to have a map 
in place by the date candidates could 
file for the 2012 primaries, the court 
required the state legislature to enact 
its plan by September 30, and, failing 
that, for the state judiciary to approve 
a plan no later than November 15. If the 
latter date were not met, the federal 
court would impose its own plan by 
January 1, 2012.
Maine Republicans wanted to arrive at 
a district map through the legislative 
process, where they retained some 
control, rather than through state or 
federal courts, especially because the 
latter would be more likely to approve 
a more incremental plan closer to 
the one preferred by Democrats. As 
Republican legislator and commission 
member Ken Fredette said in a party 
press release, “The vote that counts 
will be the one taken by the Maine 
House of Representatives and Senate 
during the special legislative session 
which is scheduled for September 27, 
2011. I would rather the legislature, not 
the courts, resolve this.”
The Apportionment Commission 
worked on the question over the 
summer of 2011, with a public hearing 
on August 23. After asking the parties 
to offer compromise plans, and seeing 
little compromise between them, 
Friedman cast the deciding vote on 
an otherwise party-line 8-7 decision 
in favor of an incremental plan very 
close to what the Democrats had 
offered (Metzler 2011b). Republicans 
immediately reminded the public that 
the consequential vote would be the 
one taken by the state legislature and 
that the commission recommendation 
was merely that.
The legislative process presented its 
own hurdle, however. By law, a plan 
could be sent to the governor for his 
signature only with a 2/3 vote of 
both chambers; Republicans, despite 
their gains in 2010, were well short of 
that threshold in the House and the 
Senate. In addition to their inability 
to sway Democrats to their plan, 
some Republicans most affected by 
the plan began to voice concerns 
as well. GOP leaders from rural 
western Oxford County objected that 
they would be moved from the 2nd 
district, which was dominated by rural 
interests similar to their own, to the 
1st district, which would be dominated 
by the interests of Portland and other 
population centers on the southern 
coast of the state (Mistler 2011).
The backlash within the party was 
similar to the resistance that prompted 
Pennsylvania Republican leaders to 
drop their Electoral College plans. In 
that case, GOP members of the U.S. 
House and the state legislature feared 
that their own electoral chances would 
be hurt if Democrats, in an effort to 
win the district-level electors, invested 
heavily in districts they otherwise 
would have written off (Hirschhorn 
2011). In Maine as in Pennsylvania, 
local self-interest by party members 
induced the party to walk back a bold 
plan to redraw the state’s electoral 
landscape.
In response to the dwindling prospects 
for their plan via the standard process, 
some Republicans in the legislature 
floated the possibility of structuring a 
vote such that it would require only a 
simple majority, noting that Democrats 
had pulled similar procedural 
maneuvers in the past on measures 
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dIstrIcts, 2012–2020
ostensibly requiring a supermajority. 
Legislative leaders quickly rejected 
the possibility, and there were two 
political reasons for them to do so. 
One was a threat that such a move 
would precipitate a people’s veto 
question on the next statewide ballot, 
a procedure that allows Maine voters 
to reject legislative acts. Because many 
more residents would be switched 
under the Republican plan than either 
the Democratic alternative or the 
commission’s recommendation, GOP 
leaders likely did not relish the chance 
to sell their more drastic version in an 
election. Second, Democrats further 
undercut Republican arguments about 
the need for a simple majority by 
pointing out that GOP leaders earlier in 
the year had cosponsored legislation to 
change the redistricting date  — which 
included a supermajority provision 
(Russell 2011b).
Acting under pressure from the court, 
the commission recommendation, 
and Democrats, the Republican-led 
legislature adopted an incremental 
map (shown in Figure 4) nearly 
identical to the commission and 
Democratic schemes by a unanimous 
vote in the state Senate and with only 
three dissenting votes in the House. In 
the end, 13 towns in Kennebec County 
switched congressional districts, 
increasing on net the estimated 
number of Republicans in the second 
district by about 2,500 voters (Russell 
2011c). The governor signed the 
plan into law a day before the court-
imposed deadline. Fourteen months 
later, both of Maine’s Democratic 
incumbents were easily reelected.
c o n c L u s I o n
Despite its successes in the 2010 
election and the high ambitions which 
followed, the Maine Republican Party 
was unable to shift the congressional 
electoral calculus to any discernible 
degree in the first and second 
districts. The plan that was adopted 
was incremental and served largely 
to protect incumbent interests; 
the incumbents protected were 
Democrats. Legislative authority over 
redistricting was conditional both on 
implicit approval by the voters via a 
possible people’s veto process and on 
judicial review. Together with growing 
rebellion in their own ranks over a more 
dramatic change in the map, these 
checks induced the Republicans to 
revert to the status quo.
Although the GOP failed to redraw 
the map for U.S. House elections, they 
succeeded in changing the calendar. 
Governor LePage and the Maine 
Republicans successfully sued to make 
Maine fall in line with the rest of the 
country and to have its redistricting 
occur in year two after a census rather 
than year three. To their chagrin, 
however, the change in calendar was 
much less valuable in the absence of a 
change in the map.
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RedisTRiCTing massaChuseTTs 2012:  
a more open Process, a more Rational map, and no indictments 
Robert G. Boatright1, Nicholas M. Giner2, James R. Gomes3 
It is generally assumed by political 
scientists that the primary goal of 
redistricting is partisan advantage. 
In states where one party controls 
the process, it will seek to maximize 
the number of congressional seats it 
holds either by packing members of 
the opposing party into a very small 
number of districts or by diluting 
opposition party representation by 
dispersing pockets of that party’s 
supporters among a number of 
districts.4 We have few theoretical 
guideposts, however, for looking at 
states such as Massachusetts — a 
state heavily enough Democratic that 
there are few ways in which one could 
draw districts that would reliably elect 
even a single Republican. Although we 
cannot yet know how Republicans will 
fare in Massachusetts’ new districts 
over the coming years, it is clear that 
the Massachusetts legislature has a 
somewhat different set of incentives 
from most other American legislatures.
In our contribution to this volume we 
seek to explore these “second order” 
incentives. There are at least four such 
incentives that we argue are at play 
here. First, state legislators (and, in 
this case, state legislative committees) 
may seek to establish a reputation 
for performing the redistricting 
task well. The 2002 Massachusetts 
redistricting was widely viewed as a 
messy, undemocratic process in which 
personal grudges played a greater 
role than normative concerns. The 
committee, and particularly the state 
senator and representative who co-
chaired it, had an incentive to perform 
in a way that would garner favorable 
media coverage and the respect and 
approval of the portion of the public, 
admittedly small, that pays attention 
to such matters. Second, personal 
relationships between legislators and 
members of Congress may determine 
redistricting’s winners  
and losers. Because Massachusetts 
lost a seat, it was clear that at least 
two members of Congress would be 
very unhappy. Although legislators may 
develop relationships with members 
of Congress — through shared 
advocacy for federal projects or simply 
through joint campaigning — not all 
members of Congress will have clout 
with the redistricting committee. As 
of 2010 Massachusetts had several 
members of Congress who serve on 
powerful committees, but only five 
of the ten House members as of 2011 
had previously served in the state 
legislature.5 Third, legislators may 
seek to bolster the clout in Congress 
of particular regions of the state. 
Redistricting may thus be, in part, 
a process of evaluating the claims 
of different regions and discerning 
which cities will dominate the politics 
of individual districts. And fourth, 
state legislators may want to lay the 
groundwork for their own potential 
future runs for Congress by creating 
districts favorable to them. Advances 
in mapmaking technology — and in the 
availability of this technology to the 
public — made pursuing these goals 
easier for legislators, but (perhaps 
more importantly) these advances 
also gave the public a greater role in 
monitoring and participating in the 
process than had been the case in  
past years.
There is ultimately no way to go 
behind closed doors (and, despite 
the openness of the process this year, 
the doors are still closed during the 
crucial committee deliberations) to 
find out why districts were drawn 
as they are. It seems evident to us, 
however, that the political logic of 
the 2012 Massachusetts redistricting 
was shaped by factors such as those 
above. How else can one explain the 
radically different nature of the 2012 
redistricting as compared to that 
1  Associate Professor of Political Science, Clark 
University (corresponding author, rboatright@clarku.
edu).
2  Ph.D. candidate, Department of Geography, Clark 
University.
3  Director, Mosakowski Institute for Public Enterprise, 
Clark University.
4  There is truly vast literature on this subject; for a 
review, see Bullock 2010.
5  These five are Representatives Frank, Keating, Lynch, 
Markey, and Olver.  Massachusetts is typical of the 
rest of the United States in this regard; 220 of the 
435 members of the House previously served as state 
legislators (Manning 2011).
of 2002, the fact that the resulting 
House districts arguably helped the 
Republican party more than they 
helped the Democratic Party, or the 
fact that the districts have, thus far, 
met with almost universal acclaim 
from everyone except the state’s 
congressional delegation? Below we 
explain the circumstances surrounding 
these changes in Massachusetts’ 
redistricting in light of our assumptions 
about what went on in the minds of 
those who actually drew the maps. 
a  r e c e n t  H I s t o r y 
o F  r e d I s t r I c t I n g  I n 
m a s s a c H u s e t t s
Massachusetts is, by many measures, 
among the most Democratic states in 
the United States. Despite Republican 
gains elsewhere in the country in 2010, 
the state re-elected its Democratic 
Governor, Deval Patrick, and all ten 
of its Democratic members of the 
House of Representatives. As of 2011 
the state’s House of Representatives 
contained 128 Democrats and 32 
Republicans, and the State Senate had 
36 Democrats and four Republicans. 
Republicans have at times been 
successful at the state level, as the 
2010 special election victory of 
Scott Brown and the gubernatorial 
victories during the 1990s and 2000s 
of William Weld, Paul Cellucci, and 
Mitt Romney show, and the state 
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congressional delegation did include 
several Republicans during the 1980s 
and 1990s. While it would be difficult 
to draw a district that would be likely to 
elect a Republican, it might be possible 
at the least to draw districts where 
Republicans would be competitive. 
State legislators have, however, never 
tried this, due no doubt to the perennial 
overwhelming Democratic majorities in 
both houses of the state legislature.
More consequentially, Massachusetts 
has also been losing population relative 
to the rest of the United States for the 
past several decades. Massachusetts 
lost a House seat in 1982 and 1992 
redistrictings, and it lost another in 
this most recent redistricting, dropping 
from ten to nine seats. In the 2012 
redistricting there was much reference 
in the media to communities of 
interest — some regions of the state 
have historically had their own seats, 
but population decline has made it 
clear that there are more communities 
and regions that believe themselves 
entitled to their own seat than there 
are seats. 
At the time the 2012 redistricting 
process began, none of the state’s 
ten incumbent House members had 
announced a decision to retire or to 
run for higher office. The redistricting 
math, then, was simple. At minimum, 
the districts would need to change 
such that at least two current House 
members were placed in the same 
district. The “winners” and “losers” 
in the process would be individual 
incumbents or particular regions, not 
Democrats or Republicans. Given 
that some of the state’s existing 
districts looked to be oddly shaped, 
and that one area of the state that 
seemed reasonably coherent — the 
southeastern region along Buzzards 
Bay — had been chopped up among 
three congressional districts, a 
redistricting plan that prioritized 
6  Swift, a Republican elected Lieutenant Governor 
in 1998, became Governor in April of 2001 when 
Governor Paul Cellucci resigned.
7  A good summary of the 2000 redistricting is provided 
in Moscardelli (2002).  Much of the discussion in  
this paragraph summarizes issues raised in the 
Moscardelli piece. 
compactness or communities of 
interest might well place more than 
two legislators in competition with 
each other. 
Absent the overriding imperative to 
maximize Democratic seats, then, 
redistricting in Massachusetts has 
caused a variety of problems as 
legislators have used the process to 
reward friends and punish enemies. 
Governors have had a minimal role 
in redistricting over the past three 
cycles; in 1992 the Republican Party 
did have sufficient numbers in the 
state Senate to sustain a veto by 
Republican Governor William Weld, 
and the map that resulted from that 
round did, in fact, produce Republican 
victories, albeit short-lived ones, in two 
of the state’s ten districts. In the 2002 
redistricting Republican Governor Jane 
Swift6 appears not to have played a 
role, and in 2012 Democratic Governor 
Deval Patrick could conceivably have 
vetoed a plan, although this veto 
would not have taken place on partisan 
grounds. In the 2002 redistricting 
then-state House of Representatives 
Speaker Thomas Finneran initially 
pushed the redistricting committee to 
carve up the district of one member 
of Congress he disliked, even though 
Massachusetts was not losing a seat 
in that year’s redistricting.7 Despite 
the fact that state law specifies 
that redistricting shall be overseen 
by a joint committee composed of 
state House and Senate members, 
Finneran, as House speaker, sought 
to preempt the joint committee’s 
proceedings by introducing his own 
proposal. Finneran’s gambit was that 
his evisceration of the Rep. Martin 
Meehan’s Lowell-based district would 
be overshadowed by the creation of 
a majority-minority district. Meehan 
ultimately sought and received 
the backing of both of the state’s 
(Democratic) U.S. senators, as well as 
the state’s (Republican) governor. The 
Senate President, in response to the 
pushback against Finneran, announced 
that the senate, unlike Finneran, 
would take incumbency into account 
and avoid pitting House members 
against each other. A gerrymandered 
incumbent protection map, with oddly 
shaped North-to-South districts in 
the Southeasten part of the state 
(but which still included the majority-
minority district proposed by Finneran), 
resulted. Finneran, meanwhile, ran 
into further trouble regarding the state 
legislative redistricting plan, which 
also appeared to play out political 
vendettas, was introduced so close 
to the state-mandated deadline that 
there was little public scrutiny, and 
was not as friendly to minorities as the 
congressional proposal. Finneran pled 
guilty to obstruction of justice in 2007 
for his false and misleading testimony 
in a suit filed in 2003 regarding the 
legislative redistricting.
In short, the 2002 redistricting was 
a complete disaster in terms of the 
process, public perceptions of the 
process, and the resulting maps. At 
a minimum, it provided a lesson for 
future legislators on what not to do. 
m a s s a c H u s e t t s 
r e d I s t r I c t I n g  L aw  
a n d  p r o c e s s
Massachusetts state law specifies 
that a Joint Special Committee 
on Redistricting is to be created 
following the decennial census, and 
this committee is then to present its 
plan to the state House and Senate 
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8  For a full summary of Massachusetts redistricting 
laws, see http://www.malegislature.gov/District/Laws.
9  This district, MA-8, has since its creation been 
represented by a white Democrat, Michael Capuano.
10  See http://www.malegislature.gov/District.
11  We provide data for shifts in territorial area here 
instead of population because geography remains 
static from one redistricting to the next while 
population shifts across decades.  Some of the 
effects of population shift are addressed below in our 
discussion of changes in partisanship.
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for approval.8 The governor has veto 
power over the eventual legislation, but 
his or her veto can be overridden. The 
2011 act establishing the committee 
stated that the committee should 
consist of seven senators appointed 
by the Senate president, one of whom 
must be a member of the minority 
party, and 21 representatives appointed 
by the speaker, of whom four must 
be members of the minority party. 
Republicans, then, were represented on 
the committee in rough proportion to 
their presence in the legislature. 
There are legal and geographic 
constraints on the process — the state 
contains sufficient, and sufficiently 
concentrated, minority population to 
construct one majority-minority district 
(this district was 51.4 percent minority 
as of the 2000 census9), and in places 
(notably the Cape Cod area) the 
state’s geography and borders limit the 
creativity of line-drawers. As in most 
other states, there are also informal 
constraints, including addressing the 
needs and desires of different regions 
and, to the extent possible, avoiding 
dividing cities and towns. 
Perhaps the most important 
informal constraint on the process, 
however, was a sentiment that the 
joint committee should not repeat 
the controversy of 2002. The bad 
aftertaste left by that redistricting 
may have prompted the legislature 
to open up the process in 2011; 
the Joint Committee scheduled 14 
public hearings throughout the state. 
The Joint Committee also set up a 
website that contained summaries 
of Massachusetts redistricting laws, 
court cases related to redistricting 
(both at the state and federal level), 
past district maps, and links to public 
mapping programs.10 The site listed the 
committee members and the public 
hearing dates, and after the public 
hearings had been completed, videos 
of these meetings were included. 
The committee also promised, and 
delivered, a two-week comment period 
between the release of proposed 
legislative and congressional maps and 
the state House vote on these maps. 
In the previous round of redistricting, 
the maps were released on a Thursday 
and voted upon on a Monday (see 
Brown 2011).
c o n s e q u e n c e s  o F  t H e  n e w  
r e d I s t r I c t I n g  p L a n
The joint committee released its 
proposed congressional map on 
November 7, 2011. Figure 1 shows 
the 2002 and 2012 maps, and Table 
1 shows the relationship between 
the geographic areas covered by 
the 2002 districts and those of the 
2012 map.11 Below, we describe the 
districting changes with reference to 
the criteria we expect would be of 
the most concern to politicians and 
Massachusetts citizens.
changes from the prior districts: 
As Table 1 shows, five of the nine 
new districts have retained more 
than 80 percent of the land area of 
prior districts. One major change in 
the map was the combination of the 
state’s two Western districts into 
one district, based in Springfield. The 
removal of this district resulted in 
the prior Springfield-based district 
shedding much of its territory in the 
central Southern part of the state, 
leading to a more compact district 
in the central part of the state. The 
central, Worcester-based district, in 
turn, lost a narrow corridor that had 
previously snaked from Worcester 
toward the Southeastern industrial city 
of Fall River. This change facilitated a 
second major alteration in the state’s 
districts, as the Cape Cod district 
became more compact, losing the 
Boston-area suburb of Quincy and 
gaining the Buzzards Bay city of New 
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Bedford and part of Fall River. The 
remainder of Fall River is now in the 
new 4th District, which had previously 
contained New Bedford but now takes 
in more territory along the border of 
Rhode Island. Although the territorial 
changes in the South Shore area of 
the state are less dramatic than those 
in the Central and Western parts of 
the state, the movement of several 
medium-sized industrial cities has 
greater ramifications in terms of shifts 
of actual voters and in terms of the 
partisanship of these districts.
Incumbents: There was substantial 
speculation in the Massachusetts 
media about the new congressional 
maps for several weeks before they 
finally appeared. The proposed state 
legislative maps had been released 
in mid-October, and at that time 
a series of rumors had circulated 
about potential changes in the three 
2012 congressIonaL dIstrIcts
 DISTRICT 1 DISTRICT 2 DISTRICT 3 DISTRICT 4 DISTRICT 5 DISTRICT 6 DISTRICT 7 DISTRICT 8 DISTRICT 9
2002 
CONGRES-
SIONAL 
DISTRICTS
DISTRICT 1 59.17 32.43 8.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DISTRICT 2 53.74 42.47 0.00 3.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DISTRICT 3 0.00 45.34 4.87 40.57 7.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.36
DISTRICT 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 46.61 2.12 0.00 0.00 1.29 49.97
DISTRICT 5 0.00 0.01 84.11 0.00 6.24 9.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
DISTRICT 6 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 99.94 0.00 0.00 0.00
DISTRICT 7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 97.87 0.05 1.99 0.00 0.00
DISTRICT 8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 8.81 0.00 87.96 3.12 0.00
DISTRICT 9 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.70 0.00 0.00 7.46 70.92 3.92
DISTRICT 10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.02 89.98
TOTAL 112.91 120.25 97.41 108.85 122.95 109.62 97.41 85.36 145.24
tabLe 1:  cHanges In terrItory oF massacHusetts congressIonaL dIstrIcts, 2002-2012
congressional districts in Western 
and Central Massachusetts and in 
the Lowell-based district of Rep. Niki 
Tsongas (Phillips 2011a, b; Sutner 2011). 
John Olver, who represented a district 
including the Berkshires and a long 
swath of the northern tier of the state 
stretching almost to the Merrimack 
Valley, announced his retirement 
on October 26, shortly before the 
proposed congressional maps were 
released but after the publication of 
several news articles speculating about 
a matchup between Olver and another 
incumbent (either Springfield’s Richard 
Neal or Worcester’s James McGovern). 
The final map would have indeed 
forced Olver to run against another 
incumbent (McGovern), but it did not 
in fact look much like those rumored 
to be under consideration before 
Olver announced his resignation. 
In the Eastern part of the state, the 
residences of Representatives Steven 
Lynch and William Keating were drawn 
into the same district, a problem 
Keating addressed by choosing to run 
in the new Cape Cod district where 
he had a summer home, a district 
containing much of the territory of his 
old district, with the notable exception 
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disTRiCT 2012  
(inCumbenT)
inCumbenT’s 
disTRiCT 
2002
PCT. 
demoCRaTiC 
2012
PCT. 
demoCRaTiC 
2002
PCT. 
RePubliCan 
2012
PCT. 
RePubliCan 
2002
PCT. 
unenRolled 
2012
PCT. 
unenRolled 
2002
PCT. 
nonwhiTe 
2012
PCT. 
nonwhiTe 
2002
1 (NEAL) 2 37.31 35.97 13.29 13.23 49.40 50.79 17.53 17.12
2 (MCGOVERN) 3 33.15 33.49 12.54 13.30 54.31 53.21 14.79 16.19
3 (TSONGAS) 5 33.40 33.49 13.36 13.30 53.24 53.21 21.52 16.19
4 (OPEN / FRANK) 4 33.41 38.32 13.11 11.32 53.49 50.36 11.00 13.60
5 (MARKEY) 7 40.60 34.00 10.66 13.27 48.74 52.72 20.65 21.68
6 (TIERNEY) 6 31.43 31.33 13.32 13.40 55.25 55.27 12.02 12.46
7 (CAPUANO) 8 55.57 56.33 6.71 6.78 37.72 36.89 48.94 45.52
8 (LYNCH) 9 40.02 41.32 11.68 11.07 48.30 47.62 20.44 25.76
9 (KEATING) 10 32.31 29.99 14.27 15.67 53.42 54.34 9.44 10.30
tabLe 2: dIstrIct cHanges In partIsansHIp and race 
Note: Partisanship data for both redistricting plans are taken from voter registration in the 2008 election. Race data from the 2000 census.
12  Rep. Tierney’s wife pled guilty to aiding and abetting 
the filing of false tax returns by her brother and served 
30 days in prison.
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of Quincy, his place of residence and 
the old district’s largest city (Phillips 
and Bierman 2011). And Representative 
Barney Frank announced his retirement 
after the redistricting; he did not cite 
redistricting as a primary reason for his 
decision, but he did hint that he was 
retiring a cycle sooner than he would 
have liked because of his concerns 
about introducing himself to so many 
new constituents (Richmond 2011). 
Had he run, he may well have faced 
a more difficult reelection contest in 
2012 than he had faced in previous 
years, although the larger turnout we 
can expect in a presidential election 
year would likely have aided any 
Democratic candidate. 
The final map, then, ultimately 
produced one open seat and no 
incumbent vs. incumbent matchups, 
but it clearly is not an incumbent 
protection gerrymander. Some 
incumbents were safer than before, 
including Representatives Tsongas 
and McGovern, both of whom 
maintained their urban bases while 
shedding some Republican-leaning 
rural and suburban areas. However, 
their security came at a cost of taking 
on many new constituents. The new 
1st district appears likely to remain 
Democratic for the near future, but 
the combination of his home city 
of Springfield with the Berkshires 
provided the incumbent, Richard 
Neal, with a somewhat competitive 
primary challenger. The state’s most 
competitive race in 2012, however, 
was the new 6th district, on the state’s 
North Shore. This district changed 
little, but ethical issues involving the 
district’s incumbent representative, 
John Tierney,12 led to a challenge from a 
prominent centrist Republican, Richard 
Tisei, and the National Republican 
Campaign Committee and various 
conservative Super PACs spent heavily 
on the race (Isenstadt 2011). Although 
Tisei led in several late polls, Tierney 
eked out a narrow victory. Barney 
Frank’s retirement appeared at first to 
have the potential to set off a heated 
Democratic primary, and Frank’s Tea 
Party-inspired 2010 opponent, Sean 
Bielat, again sought the Republican 
nomination. However, the entry of 
Joseph Kennedy III, son of former 
Representative Joseph Kennedy II and 
grandson of Robert Kennedy, reduced 
competition on the Democratic side 
and erased Republican expectations of 
winning this seat.
partisanship: Table 2 shows changes 
in the partisan and racial composition 
of Massachusetts’ districts following 
the 2012 redistricting. This table 
compares each of the incumbents’ 
current and former districts, assuming 
that if Barney Frank had remained in 
Congress he would have run in the new 
4th district. While it may oversimplify 
matters somewhat to argue that, for 
instance, the old 2nd district “became” 
the new 1st district, the data we 
showed in Table 1 clearly demonstrated 
that each of the incumbents who 
sought to remain in Congress chose 
to run in the new district that most 
resembled his or her prior district.
The partisanship data here, drawn 
from 2008 voter registration records, 
show how little Massachusetts’ 
districts changed in their partisanship. 
Whether one considers Democratic 
registration, Republican registration, 
or registration as unenrolled, it is clear 
that mapmakers sought to change the 
current districts as little as possible 
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13  Massachusetts allows citizens to register as 
“unenrolled” — essentially, to proclaim themselves 
to be independents. These voters are permitted to 
request the ballot of any party in a primary election 
without changing their registration status. The 
allegiances of unenrolled voters are a subject of 
frequent discussion in Massachusetts politics. Given 
the anemic Republican registration totals (as shown in 
Table 2), unenrolled voters are generally crucial to the 
success of statewide Republican candidates.
14  See generally Monmonier, pp. 64-76.
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in terms of their partisanship.13 Two 
districts — those of Reps. Markey 
and Keating — became slightly more 
Democratic, and one district, formerly 
held by Rep. Frank, became slightly less 
Democratic. The partisanship changes 
in the districts of Keating and Frank 
are a consequence of the movement 
of the larger cities of New Bedford and 
part of Fall River from the 4th to the 
9th districts; the change in Markey’s 
district is a result of the movement 
of some of the northern towns in 
Frank’s district to Markey’s. The large 
number of unenrolled voters in each 
of these districts makes it difficult to 
predict what might take place in future 
elections, but it is clear that there 
is only one district (the 4th) where 
Republicans were arguably advantaged 
by the redistricting.
race: Massachusetts continues to 
have one district that is nearly a 
majority-minority district; this district 
does reach that level if one sums the 
percentage of African-Americans, 
Asians, and Latinos (who may also 
identify themselves as white on the 
census). This district became slightly 
less white in the 2010 redistricting, 
although it appears that it will 
continue to have a white incumbent. 
It is technically possible to draw this 
district in a manner that includes more 
minorities — in fact, it is possible, if one 
draws districts very creatively, to draw 
two Massachusetts districts that are 
majority-minority — but doing so has 
never been a priority of the legislature 
or of voting rights organizations.
major cities: The new, nine district 
map contains no fewer than seven 
districts that are either centered 
around a major municipality (the 1st, 
2nd and 3rd are centered, respectively, 
around Springfield, Worcester, and 
Lowell), a well-recognized regional 
community of interest (the 5th, 6th, 
and 9th are centered around the 
Metrowest area, the North Shore, and 
the Cape and Islands, or a “majority-
minority” concentration of people of 
color (the 7th includes the urban and 
heavily minority communities in and 
near Boston). Only the 4th and 8th 
appear to have been constructed based 
on population remnants, i.e., who and 
where was left over after accounting 
for the cities and communities listed 
above.
compactness: Scholars have long-
since concluded that there are no 
generally preferable ways to measure 
the compactness of districts.14 
However, it is not going too far out 
on a limb to assert that the 2012 map 
represents a significant stride forward, 
in terms of compactness, from the 
2002 map. Both the western and 
southeastern parts of the state are 
divided more neatly and compactly 
than previously. The differences in the 
southeast are especially noticeable, as 
a region that had previously been sliced 
and diced among three districts has 
now been neatly cut in two. Although 
there is no way to be certain about the 
intentions of legislators, it appears that 
the notions of communities of interest 
and compactness won out in this round 
over incumbent protection, but without 
much, if any, harm to what is perhaps 
the paramount concern: protecting 
the interest of the majority party 
Democrats. 
a  m o r e  o p e n  p r o c e s s ?
The joint committee on redistricting 
certainly sought to make information 
on the redistricting process visible to 
the public. It is difficult to make firm 
connections between citizens’ ideas 
about redistricting and the maps that 
were ultimately developed by the 
committee. Because the maps are 
arguably more compact than previous 
districts; because they do not appear 
to be blatantly pro-incumbent; because 
there are arguably more competitive 
districts than were produced in 2002; 
and because the maps remedy some 
long-standing complaints about 
communities of interest (particularly 
in Southeastern Massachusetts) it 
appears that the committee did seek 
to produce “fair” results and did, in 
fact, act upon some of the testimony 
it received. Although the committee 
invited testimony, both in writing and 
during the public hearings, its website 
does not include the written testimony 
that it received.
Redistricting proposals from outside 
the legislature can be grouped into 
three categories. First, local media 
throughout the state published pieces 
about ensuring representation of 
their regions but did not endorse 
comprehensive plans. Newspapers 
in the Berkshires (at the western 
end of the state) argued that they 
were different from residents of 
Springfield (the largest city in Western 
Massachusetts) and should thus have 
their own district (Davis 2011); political 
leaders in Worcester argued that 
they were different from residents of 
Springfield or Lowell (Monahan 2011); 
and editorial pages on the state’s North 
Shore, as well, argued that they were 
different from their neighbors and 
should not be grouped with Lowell or 
Lawrence (Newburyport News 2011). 
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Testimony at the public hearings often 
followed this model; at the Worcester 
hearing, for instance, it appeared to 
us that there was an organized effort 
afoot to ensure that Worcester and 
Springfield were not placed in the 
same district and that the region west 
of the Boston metropolitan area have 
three districts. Republicans on the joint 
committee also often adopted this 
sort of argument — a convenient one 
for them, perhaps, since preserving 
three districts in an area of the state 
with only two major cities would have 
had the effect of creating at least one 
largely rural, and somewhat more 
Republican-leaning, district.
Second, an organization called Fair 
Districts Massachusetts (FDM), led by 
former Republican Senate candidate 
Jack E. Robinson and advised by 
Republican State Representative Daniel 
Winslow, released two proposed 
maps that would have had more 
compact districts and would arguably 
have increased competitiveness 
in Boston’s southern and western 
suburbs. These maps also substantially 
increased the minority population in 
the state’s majority-minority district. 
Although FDM asserted that this was 
a nonpartisan effort, it claimed that its 
proposal had pushed Frank and Olver 
towards retirement, an argument made 
prominently enough on the group’s 
website; one cannot but assume that 
it took pride in its role in ending the 
career of the liberal icon Frank in 
particular. FDM endorsed the state’s 
final maps and stated that its advocacy 
had guided the committee’s decision-
making.15 
Third, the New Democracy Coalition, 
a coalition of organizations on the left, 
also argued for the enhancement of 
the state’s majority-minority district. 
The Massachusetts NAACP and 
MassVote, an organization that also 
advocates for increased representation 
for minorities, jointly developed two 
different proposed maps that would 
have also increased the population 
of this district, but these maps did 
less to increase the competiveness of 
other districts than did the FDM maps. 
These groups also issued a statement 
approving of the committee’s process.16 
Common Cause Massachusetts did 
not explicitly endorse any of these 
proposals but it did argue for increasing 
the transparency of the redistricting 
process (as compared with the 2002 
procedure) and commended the 
committee for allowing a two week 
comment period after the release of 
the proposed maps.17 The national 
office of Common Cause issues report 
cards for the state on various matters 
of open government; although it 
gave Massachusetts a “C” overall, it 
gave it an “A” for the openness of its 
redistricting.18 These groups and FDM 
both found an unlikely ally in April 2011 
as Senator Scott Brown announced 
his support for empowering minorities 
(although Brown did not endorse any 
particular plan; see Emery 2011).
An interesting aspect of this round 
of redistricting in Massachusetts 
was the role of State Senator Stan 
Rosenberg (D-Amherst), the Senate 
chair of the Special Joint Committee 
on Redistricting. Rosenberg is a 
long-time member of the senate who 
had been mentioned as a possible 
successor to 1st District Congressman 
(and fellow Amherst resident) John 
Olver. In his own political interest, 
Rosenberg might well have wanted 
to keep Amherst together in a district 
with Berkshire County and separate 
from both Springfield and Worcester. 
But the loss of population in the 
western counties compared to the 
rest of the state would have required 
stretching the old 1st (Berkshires) and 
2nd (Metro Springfield) districts even 
farther east, sandwiching but avoiding 
Worcester (the hub of the old 3rd 
Distrtict). Such a configuration might 
also have complicated the redrawing 
of the district that is home to the 
delegation’s lone female member, Rep. 
Niki Tsongas. It may be that creating 
a favorable district for a future run by 
Stan Rosenberg would have required 
gerrymandering so obvious and bizarre 
as to be politically untenable, at least in 
the current climate.
Overall, then, it appears that citizen 
groups found much to like in the 
process, and that the only losers 
were residents of the Berkshires and, 
arguably, some of the incumbent 
representatives. The committee 
clearly sought to encourage public 
feedback and to provide citizens with 
the necessary tools with which to 
draw their own conclusions about the 
procedure. In our opinion, the process 
in Massachusetts was as open, if not 
more so, than it was in any of the other 
states we looked at. It is not at all clear 
that the committee took the various 
outside proposals into account (but 
then, how would one tell one way or 
the other?).
15  See http://fairdistrictsmass.org/FDMPressRelease.
pdf.
16  See http://massvote.org/2011/11/new-congressional-
maps-give-you-more-power/.
17  http://www.commoncause.org/siteapps/advocacy/
ActionItem.aspx?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=7809089.
18  See http://www.commoncause.org/site/
pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=4847587.  Common 
Cause certainly is not susceptible to grade inflation; 
Massachusetts’ overall “C” grade was the tenth-
highest among the states. 
o u t L o o k  F o r  F u t u r e 
r e d I s t r I c t I n g  r e F o r m s
What accounts for this change 
in the politics of redistricting in 
Massachusetts? We have already 
discussed two factors, the loss of a 
congressional seat that necessitated 
substantial redrawing of lines and 
the recent history of scandal that 
arguably set the bar higher for 
ethical conduct. A third factor, the 
much greater availability of mapping 
software and data, may have been the 
most important reason the legislature 
produced the eventual 2012 map. 
In earlier decennial redistrictings, 
mapping software was more expensive, 
less widely available, and harder to use. 
By the 2012 round, however, programs 
such as Dave’s Redistricting19 were 
available to anyone with a personal 
computer. A modicum of skills, 
patience, and the inclination to try 
one’s hand at map-making were all that 
was required to duplicate the process 
that heretofore had been confined 
to closed-door rooms at the State 
House. The website of the Joint Special 
Committee on Redistricting even had 
its own “Draw Your Own Districts” 
link,20 something that surely never 
occurred to former Speaker Finneran. 
Before the legislature began its work 
on new district maps, Massachusetts 
Secretary of State William Galvin, 
the commonwealth’s chief elections 
official — and a former state 
legislator — had publicly called for a 
new independent commission to draw 
district lines.21 His proposal was quickly 
shot down by State Senate President 
Therese Murray (D-Plymouth), and 
the near-universal praise for the results 
reached by the legislature in this round 
of redistricting will no doubt be offered 
as evidence a decade from now that 
the elected politicians are clearly 
capable of doing the job.   
Another factor worthy of note was 
that Democrats had lost their majority 
in the U.S. House of Representatives 
during the 2010 midterm elections. Had 
Democrats remained in the majority in 
Washington, the state legislature may 
well have thought better of creating 
districts that disadvantaged long-time 
powerful incumbents like Frank and 
Olver. There is, of course, no way of 
knowing how this might have played 
out, although, at least in the case of 
Frank, maintaining the thin, north-to-
south gerrymander of southeastern 
Massachusetts that, inter alia, provided 
Frank with reliable nests of Democratic 
voters in both the north (Newton and 
Brookline) and south (New Bedford and 
part of Fall River) of his district might 
have been hard to resist. 
To close with a hoary cliché, ten 
years is a very long time in politics, 
so it is hard to predict the historical 
legacy of Massachusetts’ 2012 
redistricting. Population projections 
for the 2020s make it appear 
unlikely that Massachusetts will 
lose another seat in ten years, so the 
calculus for legislators will no doubt 
be different in 2022. It seems more 
likely that a Republican will win one of 
Massachusetts’ congressional seats in 
the coming decade than it is that the 
Massachusetts legislature will become 
substantially more Republican, so 
it may well be that partisanship will 
play a greater role in the future than it 
has this year. The legacy of the 2002 
redistricting, however, clearly weighed 
on Massachusetts legislators as they 
approached the mapmaking process 
in 2012. If the early reviews of this 
year’s redistricting are any indication, 
legislators will have less to prove in the 
future than they did this year.
 
19  http://gardow.com/davebradlee/redistricting/
launchapp.html
20  http://www.malegislature.gov/District/
CreateDistricts
21  Levenson and Phillips 2010.  
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With only two congressional districts 
to draw and minimal changes required, 
the state of New Hampshire had 
one of the easiest redistricting tasks 
in the union after the 2010 Census. 
The final result barely shifted the 
contours of the two districts. Why, 
then, did the process itself take so 
long? New Hampshire was next to 
last in completing the task, with 
Governor John Lynch signing off on 
the new map on April 23 (Wichita 
Eagle 2012). The answer, in short, 
was that the process was left to the 
congressmen themselves. To be more 
specific, a simple job on paper became 
a more complicated zero-sum game 
for the two Republican incumbents, 
both of whom won their seats in the 
Republican avalanche of 2010. Now 
facing tough races to keep their seats 
during a presidential election year, 
both incumbents hoped to enhance 
their chances in their swing districts 
by squeezing out possible advantages 
in the redistricting process. The result, 
predictably enough, was a stand-
off that ultimately yielded few net 
positives for either congressman. 
a  r e c e n t  H I s t o r y  o F  
n e w  H a m p s H I r e ’ s 
c o n g r e s s I o n a L  d I s t r I c t s
The Granite State has possessed two 
congressional districts since 1882. 
The districts are divided by a single 
boundary line that runs roughly 
north-south, splitting the state into 
the eastern First Congressional 
District bordering Maine, and the 
western Second Congressional District 
bordering Vermont. The First District 
is geographically the more compact 
of the two, extending from the state’s 
largest city of Manchester to the 
seacoast; the district includes much 
of the voter-rich southern tier, which 
now serves as the outermost circle 
of Greater Boston and its suburbs. 
The Second District extends over a 
significantly larger geographical area, 
encompassing all of northernmost 
Coos County, as well as the three 
counties bordering Vermont. 
Significantly for Republicans, the 
Second District includes a strip of 
prosperous towns along the border 
with Massachusetts that have 
become part of the core Republican 
base in New Hampshire. The district 
also includes Nashua, the state’s 
second-largest city. (Traditionally, 
New Hampshire’s two largest cities, 
Manchester and Nashua, have each 
been allocated to separate districts.) 
Since 1992, New Hampshire has shifted 
from a strongly Republican state to a 
swing state in presidential elections. 
The last Republican presidential 
candidate to win a majority of the 
state’s vote was George H. W. Bush 
in 1988; his son carried the state in 
2000 with only a plurality of the vote. 
In 2004, New Hampshire was the 
only state to shift from Republican to 
Democratic, casting its four electoral 
votes for Senator John Kerry from 
neighboring Massachusetts; in 2008, 
Barack Obama easily carried the 
state over John McCain, who won the 
state’s heralded first-in-the-nation 
Republican presidential primary in 
2000 and 2008. The bellwether nature 
of the Granite State has been reflected 
in recent elections in the state’s two 
congressional districts. 
The First Congressional District is a 
true bellwether, with a Partisan Voting 
Index (PVI) of R+0. Three different 
politicians have occupied the seat 
since 2006. In that year, little-known 
progressive activist Carol Shea-Porter 
captured the Democratic nomination, 
and then pulled off one of the biggest 
upsets of the cycle in upending 
new hamPshiRe’s  CongRessional RedisTRiCTing  
Dante J. Scala*
21
Th e 201 0 Roun d  o f Con gR essi o n al R ed i sTR i CTi n g i n  new england
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of 
New Hampshire
Republican incumbent Jeb Bradley. Two 
years later, Shea-Porter successfully 
fended off Bradley’s attempt to regain 
his seat. 2010, however, was a far less 
friendly environment than the previous 
two cycles for the Democrat, and 
Shea-Porter was easily pushed aside 
by former Manchester Mayor Frank 
Guinta. 
The Second Congressional District 
has acquired a distinct Democratic 
tilt, currently possessing a PVI of 
D + 3. In the Second Congressional 
District, Republican Charlie Bass had 
held the seat since the “Republican 
Revolution” of 1994. The Democratic 
wave of 2006, however, carried him 
out of office. Four years later, when 
his successor, Paul Hodes, decided to 
run for the U. S. Senate seat vacated 
by Republican incumbent Judd Gregg, 
Bass attempted to regain his old 
seat. Facing Ann McLane Kuster, a 
Democratic newcomer with formidable 
fundraising strength, Bass nonetheless 
prevailed, albeit with less than 50 
percent of the vote. 
Both Guinta and Bass faced 
significant challenges in 2012, when 
the “enthusiasm gap” in the two 
parties’ respective bases narrowed 
considerably. Bass was widely 
considered to be the more endangered 
of the two, but in the end both lost 
their seats in the 2012 general election, 
Bass by a 50 to 45 percent margin 
to Kuster and Guinta by a 50 to 46 
percent margin to Shea-Porter. Perhaps 
redistricting would have saved one 
or the other, but the election shows 
little evidence that either candidate 
benefitted from redistricting. 
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t H e  r e d I s t r I c t I n g  p r o c e s s 
I n  n e w  H a m p s H I r e
New Hampshire’s state legislature, 
overwhelmingly Republican after the 
2010 elections, was responsible for 
redrawing district lines, subject to 
the approval of Democratic Governor 
John Lynch. In addition to the two 
congressional districts, the legislature 
also was responsible for drawing five 
Executive Council districts and twenty-
four State Senate districts; it also faced 
the formidable task of allocating the 
lower State House’s 400 seats among 
the Granite State’s various towns and 
cities. 
Compared to such work, redrawing the 
two Congressional districts appeared 
to be a fairly simple task. Population 
changes had been undramatic and 
relatively uniform across both districts, 
and therefore the two districts were 
only a few hundred votes shy of being 
equal in population. Furthermore, 
Republican leadership in the State 
House was intent on keeping the 
status quo between the two districts. 
“For State House leaders, dramatic 
change creates unnecessary drama,” 
wrote longtime Granite State political 
reporter James Pindell last February 
(Pindell 2012a). 
Given their druthers, both Republican 
congressmen most likely would have 
preferred to redraw the district lines 
in their favor. While Guinta clearly 
represented the more conservative 
of the two Granite State districts, the 
makeup of the First Congressional 
District did not offer him a partisan 
advantage. It was his colleague Bass, 
however, facing an electorate that 
clearly leaned Democratic, who 
doubtless saw a more urgent need to 
shake up the status quo in his favor. 
In particular, the Second District 
congressman wished to acquire a 
number of Republican towns for 
1  See DiStaso 2012a, Pindell 2012a.  Bass’s proposal 
apparently never gained traction among fellow 
Republicans in the State House. In fact, a House 
subcommittee on redistricting put forth a proposal 
that would make Bass’s district lean slightly more 
Democratic (Tucker 2012).
FIgure 1: new HampsHIre congressIonaL 
dIstrIcts 2002-2010
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his district that would have rid his 
electorate of its Democratic tilt. These 
towns lay mainly in New Hampshire’s 
southern tier. In the 2010 elections, a 
small set of voter-rich Massachusetts 
border towns stretching across 
Hillsborough and Rockingham counties 
had proven vital to Bass’s successful 
comeback. Bass had long had his 
eye on Bedford, a town adjoining 
Manchester, which was one of the 
most Republican in the state; such 
a shift was viewed as infeasible, 
though, because of the town’s historic 
connection with the adjoining city. 
In the end, Bass proposed a swap of 
northern towns (including the college 
town of Plymouth) for Republican-
tilting areas such as Merrimack, 
Plaistow, Hampstead, and Kingston. 
This would have left Bass in a slightly 
better position, at the expense of 
his colleague in the neighboring 
district. Bass argued that making 
his district slightly more Republican 
was in the long-term interests of 
the New Hampshire GOP. While the 
congressman, who turned 60 this 
year, described himself as a “short-
termer” in office, the benefits of such 
redistricting would accrue to the fellow 
party member who attempted to 
succeed him. Bass’s plans beyond the 
2012 election, however, were unclear.1
Guinta, who turned 42 in 2012 and 
thus had reason to anticipate a longer 
congressional career than Bass, 
saw little merit in his colleague’s 
plan. In addition, some lawmakers 
from affected towns also objected 
to the changes. The First District 
congressman suggested a simpler fix: 
move exactly one town, Waterville 
FIgure 2: new HampsHIre congressIonaL 
dIstrIcts 2012-2020
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Valley, in order to address the small 
population imbalance (DiStaso 2012a). 
This minimalist approach won the 
approval of State House leadership, 
including Speaker of the House Bill 
O’Brien. In mid-March, a House 
committee voted 14-1 to approve a 
plan O’Brien co-sponsored, which 
moved Waterville Valley and Sargent’s 
Purchase into the First District. 
Combined, the changes affected a 
mere 250 people (DiStaso 2012b).
Ultimately, the two Republican 
congressmen agreed on a more 
expansive set of changes, which helped 
Bass’s re-election prospects slightly. 
In late March, the two consented to a 
plan that swapped six towns, affecting 
some 15,000 voters. Figures 1 and 2 
show the old and new districting plans. 
Bass’s district became slightly less 
Democratic-tilting as a result, while 
doing negligible harm to Guinta’s re-
election prospects (Pindell 2012b).
In sum, during a redistricting session 
in which they held almost all the cards 
(including a veto-proof majority in the 
state legislature), New Hampshire 
state legislative leaders deferred 
to the wishes of its Republican 
congressional incumbents. And when 
the two incumbents were unable to 
reach an agreement, the Republican 
legislative leadership opted for a near 
status-quo approach more favored 
by Guinta, the congressman with the 
more Republican of New Hampshire’s 
two districts. A plan that would have 
made its Democratic-leaning Second 
District more competitive for the 
next decade was a non-starter for the 
GOP leadership. On the other hand, 
New Hampshire’s GOP did not see fit 
to strip Bass’s district of Republican 
towns, thus giving Guinta’s bellwether 
n e w  h a m P s h i R e ’ s  Co n g R e s s i o n a l  R e d i sT R i C T i n g
district a distinctive Republican 
tilt for the next decade. In all, New 
Hampshire’s GOP elected to do no 
harm to either incumbent and hope for 
the best.  
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California comprises 53 districts; 
Florida, 27; Texas, 36. Rhode Island has 
two. Congressional redistricting in this 
small state is somewhat simple when 
compared to the above-mentioned 
states. However, the Ocean State does 
have its fair share of complexities, 
which made for a stirring and 
enthralling redrawing of districts during 
the 2010-12 redistricting cycle. This 
redistricting was largely characterized 
by a political tug of war between the 
two Democratic representatives, 
David Cicilline (D – District 1) and 
Jim Langevin (D – District 2), over 
voters in Providence. The media was 
quick to highlight speculation that the 
redrawing was unevenly benefiting 
the districts, helping one politician 
more than the other. It is not overly 
surprising that those involved in the 
process have been accused of playing 
politics, since a political body—the 
state legislature—holds almost 
exclusive power over redistricting; that 
is, current state legislators comprise 
the commission that redraws district 
maps for themselves as well as for 
congressional representatives. Rhode 
Island experienced minor population 
changes that needed to be accounted 
for,1 but shifts in district lines were 
still largely political, and certainly 
contentious. 
r e d I s t r I c t I n g  I n  
r H o d e  I s L a n d
Historically, the districts in Rhode 
Island have not tended to change 
drastically over the years. There were 
three districts until 1933, when the 
state’s slow population growth relative 
to the rest of the country led to the 
loss of one district. Since then, Rhode 
Island has seen two districts cutting 
up the state in an east-west divide. 
Redistricting in Rhode Island has 
generally not been aimed at severely 
altering the districts in terms of shape 
and communities of interest; it has 
mainly been about shifting certain 
voters along the boundary lines to 
change the makeup or demographic 
of the district just enough to achieve a 
particular result. 2010 was no different.
While the criteria for redistricting 
are essentially the same across the 
nation, how it is carried out can 
vary considerably, depending on the 
geography, demographics, history, 
and political atmosphere of each 
state. On June 22, 2011, Governor 
Lincoln Chafee signed into law Bills H 
6096 and S 924, creating an advisory 
commission to redraw state legislative 
and congressional districts based on 
the 2010 census (Levitt 2013). This 
advisory commission consisted of 
18 members: four representatives 
appointed by the House speaker, two 
representatives appointed by the 
House minority leader, four senators 
appointed by the Senate president, 
two senators appointed by the Senate 
minority leader, three members of the 
public appointed by the House speaker 
and three members of the public 
appointed by the Senate president. 
For the 2010 cycle, there were seven 
Democrats and five Republicans on 
the commission (excluding the public 
members). The six public members 
tended to be somewhat politically 
active, be it on a town planning or 
zoning board, as the chairman of 
a town political committee or as a 
former state politician. Some public 
members also had experience as small 
business owners, government workers, 
or as workers in the private sector (“A 
Breakdown” 2011). 
The advisory commission conducted 
a series of public hearings, in which 
members of the public could hear 
RedisTRiCTing in Rhode island: a Zero-sum game  
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from the commission members and 
the commission members could 
hear testimony from members of the 
community. Groups such as Common 
Cause, the Rhode Island League of 
Women Voters, the Urban League 
of Rhode Island, the Providence 
Branch of the NAACP, the American 
Civil Liberties Union, and various 
newspapers frequented the meetings 
held by the commission (“Rhode 
Island Redistricting Project”). Average 
citizens, however, do not attend public 
hearings, so the media therefore played 
a major role in informing the public 
about these hearings.
The political makeup of a state is an 
important determinant of how the 
redistricting process will pan out. 
In recent years Rhode Island has 
become increasingly Democratic. It is 
the fourth bluest state in the nation, 
with 40.9 percent of voting Rhode 
Islanders registered as Democrats, 
while only 10.4 percent are registered 
as Republicans (“Gemma” 2010). In 
the 2012 presidential election, Rhode 
Island voters cast 67.2 percent of their 
votes for Barack Obama (“2012 Rhode 
Island Presidential Results”). It is 
clear that in Rhode Island competition 
occurs mostly among politicians to the 
left of center fighting to ensure they are 
chosen to represent their demographic, 
rather than among opposing parties. 
The northern and western parts of the 
state, however, do tend to be more 
conservative than the rest of the state 
and can occasionally pose a threat to 
the Democratic establishment. 
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Additionally, with 48.6 percent of 
voters registered as Independents, 
Rhode Island is a state in which 
independent/unaffiliated voters 
can easily sway elections (Cohen 
2012). This may explain why Rhode 
Island has not elected a Democratic 
governor since 1992. In 2010, while 
Democrats had the upper hand in 
their congressional general election 
contests, both Democrats campaigned 
aggressively. In the 2010 congressional 
election in District 2, Jim Langevin 
won 59.9 percent of the vote, to his 
Republican opponent Mark Zaccaria’s 
31.8 percent; however, in the open 
seat race in District 1, David Cicilline 
only won 50.6 percent of the vote 
to Republican John Loughlin’s 
44.6 percent (Cohen 2012). While 
incumbents are always interested in 
redistricting making their seats as safe 
as possible, given the narrow 2010 
margin in District 1, in 2012 Cicilline 
in particular had a strong interest in 
the redistricting process, resulting in a 
more Democratic-leaning district.
Rhode Island is not only a distinctly 
blue state — it is also the smallest state 
in the nation in terms of geography. It 
does, however, manage to satisfy the 
population requirements for having 
two districts. Rhode Island’s two 
districts, each somewhere slightly 
above 500,000 people, are smaller 
than most of the country’s districts, 
which average approximately 700,000 
people (Nesi 2011). There was early 
speculation that R.I. would become a 
single district state, since it was one 
of the slowest growing populations in 
the country between 2000 and 2010. 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 
Rhode Island gained 4,248 people 
(less than 0.04 percent population 
growth) during that decade (Mackun 
et al 2011). The population growth that 
did occur, however small, was entirely 
due to a growing minority population, 
particularly in Providence. While whites 
maintain a majority of the population, 
the number of white residents actually 
decreased in the last decade by 34,322 
people (“Rhode Island Redistricting 
Project”). The Hispanic population 
was by far the most rapidly growing 
ethnic group, increasing by 39,835 
(Parker 2012). The minority population 
increases thus have sustained Rhode 
Island’s population growth and helped 
maintain its two-district makeup. 
However, Rhode Island does not have 
a large enough concentrated minority 
population to require the creation of a 
majority-minority district. 
r e d I s t r I c t I n g  I n  2 0 1 2 :  
r aw  p o L I t I c s
Despite Rhode Island’s Democratic 
tilt, the fact that it was neither gaining 
nor losing a district, and the lack 
of a majority-minority district, the 
remapping process became convoluted 
with much political maneuvering. The 
2011 process had a distinctly political 
tone, and featured an unusual public 
spat between two colleagues within the 
Democratic Party. Since redistricting 
in Rhode Island was between two 
Democratic districts, decisions about 
who got what changes, and where, 
operated as a zero-sum game: any 
changes that benefited one politician 
were detrimental to the other.
The timeline for the Rhode Island 
process was as follows: the 
commission was required to make 
its recommendation to the General 
Assembly by January 15, 2012, and the 
General Assembly was required to vote 
on a plan in time for it to be effective 
for the 2012 elections. On December 
19, 2011, the commission voted on draft 
congressional lines, which were then 
sent to the legislature for a vote. On 
February 1, 2012, the Senate passed 
S 2178, and on February 2, the House 
R e d i sT R i C T i n g  i n  R h o d e  i s l a n d
passed identical bill H 7209. On 
February 8, 2012, both were signed 
into law by Governor Chafee. Following 
these votes, the state House lines 
were challenged in the courts, but no 
court case was brought challenging the 
congressional map.
The earliest plans unveiled by the 
redistricting commission were 
scrapped due to widespread criticism 
from both Democrats and Republicans 
on the grounds that they were too 
drastic and too blatantly aimed at 
bolstering District 2 Representative 
David Cicilline’s political fortunes. 
One, for example, known as “Plan E,” 
would have moved three of the more 
conservative towns to District 2 and 
about half of Providence into District 
1, shifting the districts of a total of 
125, 276 people. The map eventually 
approved by the legislature, “Plan F,” 
scaled back these changes but still 
moved significantly more people than 
what was needed to equalize district 
populations. As Figures 1 and 2 show, 
the districts did not look that much 
different in terms of geography. The 
town of Burrillville had been moved 
from District 1 into District 2 with more 
portions of the city of Providence being 
moved into District 1. However, Plan 
F moved about 75,016 voters, even 
though the difference between the old 
districts due to population change had 
been only 7,200 (Blake 2011).
The commission justified these 
changes by stating that it had moved 
more people than necessary so that 
minorities could have a greater voice 
in District 1. The newly redrawn 
District 1 was now 75.86 percent 
non-Hispanic White compared to 
District 2, which was 83.83 percent 
non-Hispanic White. As Table 1 
shows, Hispanics make up the largest 
minority group in both districts 
(“Rhode Island Redistricting Project”). 
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The commission, however, never 
released data on the voting behavior 
of minorities in these districts to 
demonstrate that minority groups 
would actually vote in a similar way, 
which instantly generated speculation 
that ulterior political motives were the 
real explanation for the unnecessarily 
large changes (Edgar 2011).
Most political leaders who supported 
the approved plan commended it for 
providing a greater voice to minorities. 
Critics, however, characterized it as a 
blatant attempt to pad the district with 
additional Democratic voters to protect 
Cicilline from what had been expected 
to be a tight reelection campaign 
(Blake 2011; Edgar 2012; Marcelo 2011; 
Marcelo 2012). 
In the months preceding the 2012 
election, Cicilline had been accused of 
misleading the public on the well-being 
of the city of Providence’s finances in 
his former job of mayor before running 
for Congress. Whether these claims 
were true, the details of the scandal left 
much for his opponents to seize upon. 
An official state report criticized him 
for running a “dysfunctional” budget 
system during his time as mayor that 
left the city in a state of financial crisis 
by the time he left office. To make 
matters worse, the condition of the 
city’s finances had not become public 
knowledge until the new Mayor of 
Providence had officially taken office, 
and Cicilline had already been elected 
to Congress. In fact, during his initial 
campaign Cicilline commented that 
the he was leaving the city’s finances 
in “excellent condition”—a quote 
his political opponents eagerly took 
advantage of (Mulligan 2011). No 
ethics violations or criminal charges 
were ever filed, but his polling numbers 
suffered as a result. He appeared 
distinctly vulnerable going into the 
2012 election (Cohen 2012).
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Critics of the 2012 redistricting plan 
thus claimed that the changes had 
been motivated most by a desire to 
make Cicilline more secure in light of 
these accusations. Rep. Langevin of 
the second district was particularly 
critical of the changes, perhaps mainly 
because the extra margin of safety 
given to Cicilline had been provided at 
his expense from his district. Brandon 
Dougherty, Cicilline’s Republican 
challenger, issued similar complaints, 
calling the process “political 
gamesmanship” (Marcelo 2011). 
The most telling comment on the 
politics though may have come from 
Ray Rickman, a former Democratic 
state representative and a citizen 
member of the 2010 redistricting 
commission. When asked about 
politics in the redistricting process, 
Rickman noted that the new plans 
would definitely benefit Cicilline, and 
that representatives redrawing maps  
to assist themselves or other 
politicians is “an American tradition.” 
He went on to say “Nobody says it, 
but [Cicilline] had a tough time getting 
elected the first time, and he’s going 
to catch hell the second. The people of 
Burrillville are not going to vote for him. 
He wants to get rid of them and I don’t 
blame him. Do I like the politics? No. 
Am I surprised? No,” (Klepper 2011). 
The general consensus among close 
political observers seems to be that 
the new districts had been drawn to 
benefit Cicilline, and that strengthening 
the minority voice in the first district 
was not the real motivation, even if 
they modestly had that effect.
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In addition to the controversy 
surrounding Cicilline, other 
criticisms were raised over the lack 
of transparency in certain aspects of 
the process. At one point Common 
Cause suggested that the redistricting 
process should stop, and that the 
commission had provided “incomplete 
information about maximizing 
minority representation to justify their 
decisions” (Edgar 2011). Some state 
representatives also complained about 
the lack of transparency, although 
in general the protests over this lack 
of information never moved beyond 
statements of disapproval (Marcelo 
2011; Klepper 2011).
Aside from comments about the 
lack of information on the impact of 
minorities, few objections to the new 
congressional districts were raised 
by minority groups. This may have to 
do with the small size of the state’s 
minority populations. These groups 
gave more attention to the state 
legislative districts, where minority 
voters and representatives were more 
heavily affected. 
In addition, it is worth noting that the 
relationship between Hispanics and 
African-Americans in the state has 
been tepid at best. The two groups 
have competed for power in the State 
House, often at the expense of the 
other. For example, Rhode Island’s 
voter ID law, an anomaly in such a 
liberal state, was passed partly out of 
voter concerns about corruption, but 
also because of some support from 
African-American politicians in the 
R.I. House (Moakley 2013). The lack 
of a united front by minority groups, 
relatively small minority populations, 
and a focus on state legislature 
districts thus meant that the effect 
of the new congressional districts on 
minorities received little attention. 
Despite controversy, the final 
redistricting plan received 
overwhelming support in the General 
Assembly, and was signed by the 
governor without major incident. 
Governor Chafee, a former Republican 
U.S. Senator who won the governor’s 
office running as an Independent, 
never voiced any criticisms of the 
redistricting plan. A veto from the 
governor, however, would have made 
little difference since Democrats have 
a veto-proof majority in the General 
Assembly. This may partially explain 
Chafee’s relative silence on the topic 
(Blake 2011; Thornton 2012). No 
court cases were filed against the 
congressional districts;2 however, the 
state Republican Party eventually did 
file one against the new state House 
districts map (Edgar 2012). Cicilline, 
meanwhile, rebounded significantly in 
the polls in the weeks preceding the 
2012 general election, and in the end 
he sailed to a decisive 53.0 percent to 
40.8 percent victory over Republican 
candidate Brendan Doherty. Langevin 
also held his seat without difficulty, 
garnering 55.7 percent of the vote (RI 
Board of Elections 2012).
In hindsight, Cicilline’s victory is not 
particularly surprising. Rhode Island 
has a plurality of voters registered 
as Independent, and these voters in 
the past have been open to choosing 
Republican candidates at the state 
level. With that said, the state’s voters 
have shown little taste for the policies 
of the national Republican Party, 
and candidates that get tied to more 
conservative national candidates, such 
as Mitt Romney, tend to do poorly. 
Cicilline’s relative success then may 
have more to do with his campaign’s 
ability to tie Doherty to Romney than 
with the relatively smaller changes to 
his district (Cohen 2012).
2  Given the U.S. Supreme Court’s reluctance to strike 
down instances of partisan gerrymandering, it is hard 
to imagine what sort of action might have succeeded.
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By the end of the latest redistricting 
session, a significant amount of 
frustration with the process had 
been voiced by various watchdog 
groups. The exclusive power of the 
legislative branch in the process, lack 
of transparency, and the seemingly 
brazen political motivations behind 
the changes all rank highly on the list 
of grievances. Even so, the chances 
of actual reform in the process seem 
dim at best, given the current state of 
the system. Politicians in the General 
Assembly will certainly resist the idea 
of giving up some of their power to the 
executive branch, never mind a truly 
independent commission. Democratic 
Party leaders would similarly have 
little incentive to give up power when 
they dominate the political process 
so thoroughly, particularly during 
the current string of Republican and 
Independent governors. Perhaps more 
importantly, state politicians have 
yet to face significant pressure from 
Rhode Island voters on the issue, since 
redistricting tends to be a low visibility 
issue. Without significant pressure 
from the grassroots level, the process  
is unlikely to change. 
A political movement to change the 
process before the next round of 
redistricting, however, may make little 
difference for the state’s congressional 
districts. Rhode Island has started to 
lose population since the last census, 
after only barely managing to avoid 
falling to single district status in the 
last cycle. Unless this trend reverses, 
Rhode Island will more than likely lose 
one of its districts in 2020 and will no 
longer need to be concerned about 
redrawing its Congressional districts 
(Parker 2012).
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The last round of redistricting in 
Rhode Island provides an excellent 
example of how political the process 
can become, even in a state where 
one party dominates. Redistricting 
in a two-district state can actually 
be quite contentious at times, as this 
case illustrates, since it essentially 
boils down to a zero-sum game. 
Changes in Rhode Island that benefited 
the vulnerable Representative 
Cicilline were made at the expense 
of Representative Langevin, and 
many critics alleged that political 
maneuvering to protect Cicilline played 
a heavy hand in the map’s design. In 
response, the commission attempted 
to justify its decision by saying 
that the new map tries to increase 
minority political power in District 1, 
but this claim remains only partially 
substantiated since the commission 
refused to share information on voting 
behavior. The process in the Ocean 
State is unlikely to change due to lack 
of visibility and political will, despite 
widespread frustration from certain 
interest groups. Even so, concerns 
about redrawing congressional districts 
will likely be rendered obsolete by 
2020 if the state continues to lose 
population over the next decade.
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